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Roy Saurabh

Research area

AI assurance and accountability

Claims about an AI system should be checkable by someone who was not involved in building it.

  • AI assurance
  • Regulation
  • Reproducibility

What evidence about an AI system is adequate for a particular decision, held by a particular role, in a particular deployment?

Most assurance work asks whether a model is good. That is the wrong unit. A model is not deployed, a system is, into an institution, for a decision, under a regulation, with someone accountable for the outcome. The same model can be adequately evidenced for one of those situations and badly evidenced for the next.

My work here builds methods and software that make that distinction operational: analysing risk as a function of deployment context, reasoning over regulatory obligations as executable statements rather than prose, and testing whether a body of audit evidence actually supports the decision it is offered for, including the cases where plausible-looking evidence does not.

Outputs

Related work

Projects

Projects in this area

  • An assurance toolchain for deployed AI

    A connected set of reproducible tools for deployment-conditioned risk analysis, executable regulatory reasoning, evidence adequacy scoring and adversarial stress testing.